The United States of Comprehensive Nuclear Testing
Anirudh Bhagavatula, reporting from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), discusses the simmering cauldron of nuclear testing.
The IAEA has always been at the forefront of the nuclear diaspora since its inception. Pertinent to the emphasis on the protection of nuclear material is the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), a crucial cog outlining the blueprint for the safety of nuclear material. But a major treaty often being overlooked is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which states that all nuclear explosions are banned with respect to any country or region. The important thing to note here is that the United States of America (USA) leads the list of the 28 member states of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) not to have ratified the treaty [1].
USA has fallen foul of ratifying treaties in the past, albeit the hole left in the CTBT is more pronounced. The significance of CTBT has been deliberated upon as its efficacy always ends up under the radar: with states like India, Pakistan and China also not being in favour of ratifying it anytime soon. Analysing the stance of the USA in itself brings about an intriguing vantage point to this particular treaty. According to the USA, there are multiple reasons as to why ratification of the treaty is not the best possible option. The foremost point vindicating USA’s stance is that of weapon modernisation; if the weapons are not tested or developed, the nuclear arsenal of USA might be a threat to other external forces developing new nuclear technologies clandestinely, namely the nations who have not yet ratified the treaty.
An alternative standpoint piques the individual clique of nations backing USA’s stance on the CTBT—the safety perspective. It is said that testing leads to observations on how to make nuclear weapons even safer, per the US Navy’s testing system on their Trident Missile System back in 1992. The Navy, on testing their existing warheads, decided that a safer way to improve upon the existing warheads was to not create a new warhead, but change the way in which the existing warhead was loaded onto the submarine [2].
Now, to rebut this alternative line of questioning from the USA, there are two arguments which hold themselves in good stead. Due to the burgeoning political clout of USA, the ratification of the CTBT by them would lead to a host of countries following suit. The second and most important point is scientific in nature and cannot be spurned; the propensity or the degradation of weapons-grade plutonium does not increase exponentially with age. This ensures that the qualms about degrading nuclear ability do not count as substantive reasons to refute ratifying the CTBT.
IAEA’s Plan of Action to Promote the Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols has been constantly updated since its inception. Yet, it heavily relies on the adherence to the existing nuclear treaties for the execution of the particular set of actions plans.
The level of nuclear safety and the level of physical protection required to earnestly empower nuclear energy can only be achieved if the CCPNM and the CTBT work in tandem along with the cooperation of their member states. The USA, the Republic of India, and the People’s Republic of China, along with the State of Israel, have a shared responsibility in ensuring that the standoffs are resolved. The cliché about nuclear safety not being resolved at a higher and a more earnest platform must be dissolved; it is in the hands of the countries that are not a party to the CTBT to corroborate and tie up their ends of the rope to ensure that the states are united at all times: akin to a nuclear family.
Sources:
[1] https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/status-of-signature-and-ratification/
[2] http://www.bu.edu/globalbeat/usdefense/Bailey011599.html#Facing
[3] https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/final_action_plan_1_july_2014_to_30_june_2015.doc.pdf
(Edited by Shruthi Subramanian.)
Pandemonium
Reporting from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Gargee Singh Bhadoria opines on the grave threat of nuclear terrorism.
Political leaders and heads of institutes around the world agree that nuclear terrorism poses an undeniable danger to the world and its inhabitants. Some might say the menace of nuclear terrorism started looming when the perfect face of extremism Osama Bin Laden proclaimed “The Nuclear Bomb of Islam”. Since then, there has been a particular rise in extremist groups threatening nuclear violence even though they are yet to succeed.
Many conventions and resolutions have been introduced and put into force to better protect the nuclear stockpiles of the world. The amendment to the Convention for Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) has served to classify and define nuclear terrorism. [1] The Resolution 69/50 of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) applies itself to “preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive sources”. [2]
Despite all these commendable actions, the threat still looms in the sky; like a dragon circling a village but not attacking it with its might and fire. This is partly due to the fact that past attempted coups by extremist groups have been somewhat successful. In 1994, about 130 barrels of enriched uranium residue were stolen from the Pelindaba nuclear research centre—100 barrels of which are still unaccounted for. [3] In 2007, four assailants were able to surpass the laudable security of Pelindaba and steal laptops containing important information on alleged new technology in nuclear power generation. [4] There have been other sites which have been subject to infiltration and theft which put the security of nuclear materials and pertinent information at risk.
According to the Belfer Center, extremist groups like Al Qaeda, Chechnya–based separatists, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Aum Shinrikyo have showed interest in acquiring and using nuclear weapons against masses. Apart from these organisations, Hezbollah and Taliban also have the wherewithal to acquire nuclear weapons. In fact, it is known that Aum Shinrikyo and Al Qaeda have tried to obtain nuclear fissile material on the black market [5].
The attacks in Paris in the January of 2015 have renewed the call for better nuclear security measures. [6] Although the IAEA is the pioneer of introducing standards for nuclear security, it is an organisation that does not enforce any conventions. The access to information about certain states’ stockpile and security measures is restricted. This is due to the element of voluntary submission and inspection by the member parties.
Apart from the pre-existing highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium that can be used to create weapons of mass destruction and radiation, there lies another conundrum. Building nuclear weapons requires HEU or plutonium (which are not naturally found) are tough to manufacture. Most countries and organisations with these materials in their centres take high security precautions and hence are less vulnerable to attack and burglary. However, nuclear power plants that use low-enriched uranium (LEU) produce nuclear waste. The LEU and the waste are harmless in its normal state; however, on reprocessing it can produce plutonium, which in turn can be used to manufacture nuclear weapons. This practice is popular in the Republic of Japan (Japan), United Kingdom (UK) of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, French Republic (France), Russian Federation (Russia), etc. to make new and better fuel. Following the road less taken, the United States of America (USA) has introduced a ban on domestic reprocessing [7].
All these aforementioned routines have done their best to make the world a better place. Nevertheless, a naked sword of nuclear terrorism hangs loosely in the air; swinging this way and that, never betraying its intention of falling and piercing the man through the neck. Sure, we have placed a few membranes between the sword and the man, but all those skins look very permeable and would give in under enough pressure. Every day, it becomes easier for an extremist group to acquire information on how to build a terrifying weapon; all they need are the materials. Are the materials really that hard to acquire? Probably and probably not. Although the USA and Russia deny it, potent nuclear weapons and submarines have disappeared from their arsenal. [8] With the limited knowledge available to the IAEA, as well as the masses, it is hard to make an accurate guess of how deep the waters are and where we stand. All we know is that there are sharks in the water; it is their home. Soon enough, there will be blood too; and they will come for us—hungry, gnashing their teeth.
Sources:
[1] https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc274r1m1.pdf
[2] https://www.francetnp.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/preventing_the_acquisition_by_terrorists.pdf
[3] http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/the-treaty-of-pelindaba-on-the-african-nuclear-weapon-free-zone-297.pdf
[4]https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/how-armed-intruders-stormed-their-way-into-a-south-african-nuclear-plant/2015/03/13/470fc8ba-579d-4dba-a0c0-f0a1ed332503_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8f3d4de26b42
[5] https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/nuclear-terrorism-fact-sheet
[6] https://www.francetnp.gouv.fr/nuclear-security-and-combating-nuclear?lang=fr
[7] https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/nuclear-terrorism#.XG_u1-gzZPZ
[8] http://mentalfloss.com/article/17483/8-nuclear-weapons-us-has-lost
(Edited by Shruthi Subramanian.)
Peace in the Nuclear Peninsula
Anirudh Bhagavatula, reporting from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), deliberates upon the everlasting debate between nuclear power and peace, and how peace is indelibly linked to the harmony between two nations.
Nuclear energy and the quest for peace perpetually seem to traverse two paths—one of harmony and the other filled with disdain. This conundrum begets us to analyse longstanding issues, mired within treaties which have existed since decades. Analysing the proposed Fissile Missile Control Treaty (FMCT) might give us a bird’s eye view of the reason why progress on nuclear safety is stalling. The FMCT represents a proposed international agreement that would prohibit the production of the two main components of nuclear weapons: highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium. [1] Presently, this treaty comprises five recognised nuclear weapon states—the United States of America (USA), the United Kingdom (UK) of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Russian Federation (Russia), the French Republic (France), and the People's Republic of China; and more significantly, it comprises non-Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) members—the Republic of India, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The idea of the treaty is straightforward and effective (if formulated).
Thus, arises the problem going by the name of non-compliance. The hand is forced when the card goes missing; in this case, Pakistan essays the role of a culprit to the hilt, being the only country to oppose the formulation of any such treaties. Pakistan’s reasons are hidden behind a thin veil, scarcely obscuring the big picture. The aforementioned FMCT is composed of well-thought out recommendations formulated in the United Nations’ Conference on Disarmament (UNCD) and composes of a remarkably detailed blueprint wherein the only facet Pakistan is in opposition to is that the current nuclear stockpiles of member states are not taken into account. [2] On scratching the surface, the aforementioned issue generates a sporadic amount of sense, considering the fact that the possibility of a nuclear war has been deemed to be unlikely. On closer investigation though, one may figure out that the frosty relations between Pakistan and India may be, in fact, the rusty cog in the dial.
The relations between the two countries have already been documented elaborately since their very inception as two separate member states. These two members have been susceptible to altercations in the past, with the same browbeaten path of bilateral negotiations to trod on. The dilemma that this creates for Pakistan is that the existing nuclear stockpile of India is far bigger compared to the existing stockpile of Pakistan. This ushers one to the standpoint as to how ties between two nations are causing reverberations felt all across the nuclear spectrum. If the reservations of Pakistan do not tally with reality, one can only concur to the notion that the only impasse is being caused by Pakistan’s neighbour having the larger stockpile—and not the world as a whole. If the demographics are worked out, this irrepressible standoff will near the end of the tunnel one day. There may be some solutions to right this wrong of two nations combating against each other; at least in terms of the broader nuclear diaspora, the one thing that many nations need to build between them is trust. Trust can be developed in more ways than one in this niche. There should be an IAEA inspection team at the two nations' nuclear plants monitoring from time-to-time, reporting on the movements “between the plants.” This would ensure and assure India as well as Pakistan about the nuclear manoeuvres on both the sides, enabling them to proactively forge a consensus on the proposed FMCT.
Until the proposal becomes a reality—and not a far cry from it—the future will be obscure. The nuclear powers must unite and untie the knots of dubiety between the two. Peace and nuclear energy are not aeons away from the utopian commingling. The time is now to rewrite the antecedents—to delve a new path to a wholesome Planet Earth.
Sources:
[1] https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/fmct
[2] http://fissilematerials.org/countries/pakistan.html
(Edited by Shruthi Subramanian.)
Box it Up
Reporting from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Gargee Singh Bhadoria talks about the accumulating nuclear waste and its security.
The Little Boy and the Fat Man (still a boy) fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; and with it, they dragged a new era to present itself. There was now a new, unexplored technology in the market with untold possibilities; and one of those possibilities was war. After the end of the Cold War, the Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. They had learnt their lesson playing with the ‘Boys’ and thought it was time for them to go to bed for a while. The United States of America (USA) and the then United Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) went on a long journey—dismantling all their ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and missile launchers within the short-medium range and intermediate range as per the INF treaty. This led to heaps of nuclear waste gathering in the confines of these countries; waste that remains untreated till now with no solution on how to deal with it.
Now, we may have cancelled the boys’ play time, but that did not mean they could not be involved in other activities. They were allowed to prosper in a different direction. Nuclear technology made progress in the fields of electricity, agriculture, medicine, etc. All this usage led to even more accretion of radioactive waste.
Nuclear technology has now become the norm. The French Republic (France) has the second largest nuclear reactor fleet in the world. A recent report compiled by a panel of experts talked of the inadequacies of the management of nuclear waste in the country. France depends highly on its nuclear power for production of electricity—more than 75 per cent. The panel found that “there is no credible solution for long-term safe disposal of nuclear waste in France”.
Over France, comes the United States of America (USA) with its hugely spread nuclear reactors, research and, development centres and other nuclear facilities—the biggest nuclear fleet in the world. Still carrying the memories of Cold War, it has not been able to deal with the waste from the disarmed missiles and warheads. Further, the continuous use of nuclear energy in day-to-day life creates more waste to pile on top of it. The nuclear facilities of USA are littered with cooling pools that contain spent fuel waiting to be transferred to a permanent storage. However, that permanent storage is nowhere to be found. The Nuclear Waste Policy of 1982 promised the USA federal government would find a suitable geological repository for all radioactive waste. They have failed in their promise. Moreover, the Yucca Mountain underground facility which could have served as safe disposal site was cancelled in 2010 despite being ‘under construction’ for decades.
The only feasible solution right now are dry casks, which could reduce the safety hazard that comes with radioactive waste. Although, this is not a long-term solution. The only long-term solution known to us at this point in time are geological repositories that may withstand earthquakes and other natural phenomenon without any leaks of radioactive material. Nevertheless, they remain out of our grasp.
The boys were born too soon, and their parents were unable to plan their life properly. We let them play and then we sent them out in the world all grown up, ignorant of their callousness and the mess that they will inevitably leave behind. The environmental and health risks associated with this poorly stored radioactive waste are many. Every day, the slope gets more slippery. Yet we march on it, unknown to the musings of the ground beneath our feet. Although the waste stockpiles may be ferociously guarded, the uncouth way they are stored makes them vulnerable to nuclear terrorists looking for ways to create ‘dirty-bombs’. Yet, there remains this air of indifference around the growing radioactive waste heaps that get bigger every day. If an optimal solution is not found, we may be drowning in it—while our lungs burn, eyes water, and breaths become shallower.
(Edited by Shruthi Subramanian.)