International Instruments for a Nuclear Orchestra?
Anirudh Bhagavatula, reporting from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), discusses about some pertinent instances in the committee with respect to treaties such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
As the names of various nuclear treaties echoed through the walls of the room, the delegates debated at length as to how treaties like the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) affect the nuclear spectrum across the world. The Delegate of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) stirred some bees in the hive by emphasising on facets of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) and this ended up raising eyebrows, as DPRK, despite not being a party to the aforementioned convention in any form decided to elaborate on the Articles of the ICSANT. This constituted a sanctimonious stance as per the other delegates present in the committee.
At this juncture, the Delegate of the Federal Republic of Germany decided to take a detour from the issue at hand and accused the United States of America (USA) of skirting around. He decided to point out instances where the USA backed out, including the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, also known as the Iran Nuclear Deal. As the tides abated, the Delegate of the People’s Republic of China embarked on a neutral path, substantiated by the focus on improving the current inclusivity measures. She urged the council to look for measures to allow all parties, regardless of their ratification status, to be allowed to participate in gatherings with regard to CPPNM.
The Delegate of the Russian Federation (Russia) added on to the burgeoning list of suggestions in order to combat the analogous terminology of CPPNM, pointing out Article 4 as a prime example. She referred to the “Burden of Safety” wherein the transportation of nuclear materials through the non-nuclear-powered states leads to a host of concerns. She briefly talked about how transportation of nuclear materials through the Federal Republic of Nigeria placed the legal burden upon Nigeria to protect the material, which it is not capable of handling, as Nigeria is not a nuclear-powered state.
The constant back-and-forth debate led rise to a rather productive set of suggestions and also some sceptical observations, steering the council closer to a consensus.
(Edited by Shruthi Subramanian.)
Follow My Hunch
Reporting from the International Energy Agency (IAEA), Gargee Singh Bhadoria details the discourse of the delegates with respect to the impending cyber threat to the nuclear facilities.
With the murmurs of Natanz nuclear power plant in the air and the word ‘Stuxnet’ on their lips, the delegates of the various countries turned their minds to the menace that are cyber-attacks. The Natanz plant was the site of a worm that unleashed the destruction of over a thousand uranium enrichment centrifuges. This attack garners greater influence because it happened at a facility that happened to be ‘air-gapped’—which means that it was disconnected to any and all external networks. [1]
The Delegate of Kingdom of Sweden (Sweden) asked the committee to consider and learn from the case study of the 2014 incident of a nuclear operator being hacked. The Republic of Korea (South Korea) was found to be under a cyber-attack, which they attributed to the Obama government of the United States of America (USA). [2] The Delegate believed that significant lessons could be derived about the importance cyber security from this event. He also stated that a deeper look into it would yield preventative measures.
However, the Delegates of Kingdom of Norway (Norway) and Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Pakistan) were of the view that the strongest and fastest way to fight cyber attacks is to constantly keep updating the hardware and software employed; as well as improve upon them.
A solution was brought to the light by the Delegate of the French Republic (France). He proclaimed that although air-gapping is quite an effective way of isolating and protecting nuclear facilities’ and their data, relying on just a software barrier is naïve. He believed that a good way to immunise nuclear facilities would be use hybrid systems that comprised both software and hardware. He believed that these systems would prove harder to hack and would add a new layer of security—along with personal physical security—to the intellectual and physical paraphernalia present in a nuclear facility.
The members of the committee went and knocked at every door visible to them, looking for clues and answers. Unfortunately, they failed to consolidate all their clues to see the entire puzzle. Since, they did not have the whole riddle, they were unable to solve it.
Sources:
[1] https://www.bbc.com/timelines/zc6fbk7
[2] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/22/south-korea-nuclear-power-cyber-attack-hack
(Edited by Shruthi Subramanian.)
Treading the Thin Line Towards Safety
Anirudh Bhagavatula, reporting from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), discusses about the proposals mooted by the delegates to make the nuclear world a safer place.
As the council ticked closer to consensus, productive discussions dominated the table, as ideas and novel solutions came to the fore of an engaging discussion on nuclear safety. The Delegate of the People’s Republic of China came up with the conceptualisation of a Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) Review Conference, wherein the existing qualms of the member states would be taken into purview and the verbose nature of the document be open to an amendment through which the phrasing of certain Articles of the CPPNM Treaty could be rectified.
The Delegate of the Russian Federation (Russia) then added to the points made by the Delegate of China, representing the formulation of a National Nuclear Security Region responsible for maintaining the safety and security of a region following which, the Delegate representing the Republic of the Congo urged the committee to include methods to deal with Nuclear Waste as part of the mandate. The Delegate of the United States of America (USA) chimed in with his views on how the global security level could be enhanced especially with regard to the existing safety measures.
The Delegate of the French Republic (France) raised major concerns about the safety of nuclear material being transported and acts of nuclear terrorism going unheard of. The Delegate of the USA directed the attention of the committee towards the cybersecurity measures capable of battling threats to nuclear safety. He pointed out the example of Stuxnet attack being a highly malicious method of hacking into networks considered to be secure otherwise. The delegate of Spain coined in the existing disparity about the international laws and regulations clashing with the domestic regulations and vouched for these to be discussed on a public platform.
The discussion led to a plethora of solutions (albeit not devoid of concerns) as the council’s delegates made a positive effort to endorse a constructive flow of proceedings, leading to a worthwhile deliberation.
(Edited by Shruthi Subramanian.)
Nuclear Family
Reporting from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Gargee Singh Bhadoria elaborates on the views of the delegates as they discuss burden of nuclear safety in cases of two parties being involved.
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) is a vast document that covers many aspects of nuclear security. One such aspect would be the burden of security of nuclear materials during their transport across transnational borders. These particular guidelines are part of the Article Four of the CPPNM and formed the crux of the discussion.
The Delegate of the Russian Federation (Russia) believed that the Article was deeply flawed. According to her, the CPPNM placed the burden of nuclear security during transportation lied on the country the transportation was occurring from, not the country it was being transported to. She stated that this skewed imbalance was unfavourable as it sometimes put non-State Parties in charge rather than State Parties that are part of the convention. She suggested that this load be shared equally by the two countries involved. The Delegate gave the present example of how Russia being stuck at crossroads in Federal Republic of Nigeria (Nigeria)—where the nation is having trouble transporting nuclear material, as Nigeria cannot provide adequate protection. She believed that in cases like this, a bilateral cooperation would work better; and hence, it should be the norm.
The Delegate of Swiss Confederation (Switzerland) pronounced that although he understood that the Article Four was made that way to protect the sovereignty of the countries, it is not optimal. The Delegate supported Russia’s claim to make the burden of reliability of nuclear security a sharable one. He was however, quick to point out that such bilateral connection should only be sustained as long as it follows Article Six—which provides confidentiality measures regarding collusion with other State Parties.
The Delegate of United States of America (USA) was enraged by Russia’s attempts at Nigeria. He declared that if Nigeria does lack appropriate nuclear security, it should be kept far away from nuclear materials. He accused Russia of having ulterior motives hidden in their civil nuclear arrangement with Nigeria.
The conversation that began with correcting a loophole in the CPPNM turned into a blame game that aligns with the interests of USA and Russia. Rather than focussing on the issue at hand, they chose to take out their frustration on each other because of the tensions created by USA’s withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty.
(Edited by Shruthi Subramanian.)
The Question of the Jurisdiction
Anirudh Bhagavatula, reporting from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) analyses the results from a poll assessing the crucial stances of the states, testing the waters of the legal shores.
The results of the poll threw up a series of surprises and some expected stances as the belief pervaded that a combination of both sets of laws may be the most prudent way to move ahead as far as the physical protection of nuclear material is concerned. The debate on the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) rages on.
The nuclear-powered states and the non-nuclear-powered states provided contrasting observations, as the People’s Republic of China clung to the belief that interestingly, a combination of both jurisdictions is the best for the issue at hand. Despite the recent tussles at the global level, the Islamic Republic of Iran viewed International jurisdiction as the one prevailing authority over the protection of nuclear material, raising eyebrows across the nuclear diaspora.
Countries like the United States of America, the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan all held views that physical protection should only be subject to the domestic jurisdiction, along with the French Republic, and the Federal Republic of Germany. The broad consensus that a combination of laws best serves the purpose should be taken into account, but existing anomalies need to be addressed to avoid skirmishes between organisations like the IAEA and individual member states in the future.
(Edited by Shruthi Subramanian.)
Of Monsters and Men
Reporting from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Gargee Singh Bhadoria analyses where the committee stands on the issue of nuclear disarmament and terrorism.
The majority of the committee chose to abstain from the question of whether nuclear disarmament may curb the chances of nuclear terrorism. The countries abstaining from this question includes the likes of the Republic of India (India), United States of America (USA), Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Pakistan), Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran), State of Israel (Israel) and the Russian Federation (Russia). All these countries have on thing in common—although they preach peace, they have always listed a number of fickle reasons about why weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) should be allowed.
The French Republic (France) was among those who replied with a curt ‘no’ while still showing their face. This was very much in line with their current actions as they push the boundaries of nuclear treaties in the recent event of USA’s withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty. France has resorted to testing nuclear missiles as a way of showing that they are still nuclear-capable.
A whopping number of 15 chose to say ‘yes’ to disarmament for the protection and removal of the possibility of nuclear terrorism. Unsurprisingly, these countries happen to have no nuclear capabilities and hence: no ulterior motives. The story remains the same—preach peace and yet court war at the same time.
(Edited by Shruthi Subramanian.)